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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Saturday May 28, 1977 CG NIDC 77-124C

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, May 28, 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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# USSR: Constitution

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[ ] Plans for replacing the "Stalin constitution" with a "Brezhnev constitution" are going forward swiftly. It seems increasingly likely that political issues raised by the draft of the new constitution in some way precipitated the abrupt, unceremonious ouster of disgraced President Podgorny from the Politburo at the Central Committee plenum meeting on Tuesday. There is no firm evidence as to the precise issues or what will be the political ramifications of his departure.

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[ ] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet met yesterday to hear general Secretary Brezhnev's report on the draft of the new constitution. The session approved the draft "in the main" and decreed that it be published for public discussion on June 4. The draft will be given final approval at a special session of the USSR Supreme Soviet scheduled for October. The date was obviously chosen to coincide with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. At the session yesterday, Politburo member Suslov, the senior ideologist, reported on the new national anthem.

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[ ] The Tass announcement did not mention whether Podgorny attended the Presidium meeting, although as president of the Presidium he would have been expected to be there. His absence would suggest that he is no longer acting as president, although formal action on his release may not come until the Supreme Soviet session that opens on June 14.

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[ ] The US embassy in Moscow reports that a message of thanks from Finnish President Kekkonen for his recent visit to Moscow was addressed, as in the past, to the three top leaders by name. When published by *Pravda*, however, it was addressed to the leadership in general.

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[ ] In a speech on the draft constitution, Brezhnev used Khrushchev-like formulas, implying that the dangers that formerly demanded rigid control mechanisms had lessened. Relaxing controls, however, may have become highly controversial because of the approaching European security and cooperation review conference opening next month in Belgrade.

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[ ] Unofficial comments in Moscow recently portray Podgorny as increasingly out of step. A Central Committee employee says that for about the past year Podgorny's attitude toward the general line was uncooperative, even obstructionist. In leadership meetings he would frequently challenge the consensus, asking, "Aren't we going too fast?"

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[ ] There have been other signs that Podgorny disagreed with some aspects of Brezhnev's detente policies and that he has held differing views on other matters of interest to the General Secretary. [ ]

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#### ANGOLA: Coup Attempt Fails

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[ ] //Members of a dissident faction of the ruling Popular Movement staged the unsuccessful coup attempt in Angola yesterday. The faction, led by the former interior minister, has long criticized President Neto for not moving faster in converting Angola into a radical socialist state. Although Neto asserted last night that the rebellion has been crushed, the government's inability to deal with the continued deterioration of the economic and military situation may cause more coup attempts in the future.//

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[ ] The dissidents seized control of Radio Luanda for several hours and proclaimed the installation of a "revolutionary dictatorship of the exploited classes." They also attacked the presidential palace and army headquarters and freed two of their leaders from prison. The two--Nito Alves, the former interior minister, and Jose van Dunem, the former chief of the Angolan military forces--are outspoken critics of the Neto regime and were jailed after Neto dropped them from the party's central committee last week. We cannot confirm press reports that the two have been arrested again.

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[ ] The government had regained control of the radio station by yesterday afternoon, and all government troops were ordered to return to their bases. A dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed. In an address to the nation last night, Neto said that many had been killed and wounded in the coup attempt; press reports confirm heavy fighting took place.

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
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[redacted] Press reports suggest that Cuban troops may have participated in the recapture of the radio station, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban or Soviet involvement. Cuban troops were also reported to be patrolling the city and frisking civilians.



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#### BANGLADESH: Referendum

*[redacted] General Ziaur Rahman is expected to win overwhelming support for his continued rule as president of Bangladesh in a referendum on Monday. He is popular with both the people and the military and has coaxed many of Bangladesh's politicians into supporting him. The opposition is divided, but if the referendum turnout is low it could stimulate a campaign to oust Zia.*

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*[redacted] Zia was installed as president last month, although he has been de facto ruler since a military coup in November 1975. His government has brought a degree of stability and prosperity to Bangladesh unknown since it gained independence from Pakistan in 1971. Many Bangladeshis believe the only alternative would be a return to the violence and corruption of past civilian governments.*

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*[redacted] Zia's shrewd handling of incipient army mutinies and his crackdown on government corruption and inefficiency have given him the image of an honest, dedicated leader. His trip to China last winter and the improvement in relations with India have also enhanced his prestige at home. Good rice harvests and plentiful foreign aid have further strengthened his support.*

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*[redacted] Bangladesh has a Muslim majority, and Zia's declaration of intent to amend the constitution to make Islam one of*

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the fundamental principles of the state brought public pledges of support from the Muslim political parties. The Muslim leaders probably are privately waging a get-out-the-vote campaign among their followers.

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[ ] Once Zia has demonstrated his popular support, he is likely to begin building a political party of his own in preparation for the national election he promised for December 1978. Many supporters of the Muslim parties and moderates in the other parties might defect to a Zia-led party.

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[ ] Both the highly politicized Hindus and Christian minorities--about 16 percent of the population--are disturbed by Zia's decision to make Bangladesh an Islamic nation, and might vote against him on Monday or stay at home. Should he unexpectedly lose, win by only a small margin, or more likely, should the voter turnout be small because of lack of interest, Zia's opposition might be encouraged to organize a campaign to replace him with an elected civilian government before December 1978. Such a campaign would be effective only if Zia lost military support as a result of his showing in the referendum.

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PORTUGAL: Threat by Opposition Parties

*[redacted] //Portugal's two major opposition parties are taking advantage of growing public dissatisfaction with the minority Socialist government to try to force changes that will give them more influence over policy decisions. They issued a joint communique on Wednesday harshly criticizing the government, but their intent was probably an effort to press the Socialists into consulting them on government programs rather than the preliminary round in a campaign to bring down the government.*

*[redacted] After a joint meeting, the centrist Social Democratic Party and the conservative Social Democratic Center said that Portugal can no longer tolerate the Socialists' "vague policies"*

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[ ]

and that minority rule that survives on case-by-case agreement cannot last much longer. The two parties are trying to take advantage of public unhappiness with the limited accomplishments of Prime Minister Soares' government. The economy has improved slightly in the ten months since the Socialists took office, but prices continue to rise, jobs are scarce, refugee problems are unresolved, and unrest is building over agricultural, educational, and Azorean problems.

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[ ] The opposition parties have supported the Socialists frequently but are impatient with the government's refusal to consult them on policy matters. They want to play down their own differences and attempt to force the Socialists to join with them and to isolate the Communists.

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[ ] The Socialists, who have avoided alliances with parties to the right or the left in order to maintain unity within their own ranks, declined to attend the meeting with the opposition parties. Another session is scheduled for next Wednesday.

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[ ] Social Democratic Center leader Freitas do Amaral said that the Socialists might face an early election if they refuse to change their ways. The opposition has not, however, directly challenged the government by calling for a vote of no confidence. The Socialists control 40 percent of the legislature and could probably survive with the support of the Communists' 15 percent.

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[ ] The opposition parties' determination to challenge the Socialists will be clearer when pending legislation on labor, agrarian reform, and the economy comes to a vote. The proposals are generally moderate and are badly needed. The Communists say the proposals are aimed at a "capitalist recovery" and are unlikely to support them.

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[ ] If the Social Democrats and the Social Democratic Center withhold their support, President Eanes may be forced to call for the formation of a new government. The opposition parties would prefer a nonpartisan government under Eanes' strong presidential leadership.

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25X1 [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] Eanes' efforts to balance left and right have  
apparently irked some conservative military officers. They do  
not appear ready to do more than complain, however, and Eanes  
remains the key to stability in Portugal. [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

WESTERN EUROPE: CSCE

25X1 [redacted] *A report approved by a committee of the Western Eu-  
ropean Union stresses the need to avoid East-West friction  
over human rights at the European security and cooperation re-  
view conference in Belgrade next month.*

25X1 [redacted] The report, approved by the Union's political com-  
mittee on May 9, argues that the issue of human rights viola-  
tions in the USSR and Eastern Europe should be played down. It  
recommends that the Belgrade conference concentrate on develop-  
ing new ways to encourage greater East-West cooperation, and  
maintains that progress on human rights is dependent on progress  
in detente.

25X1 [redacted] The document was prepared by Sergio Segre, a promi-  
nent Italian Communist who is chief of the party's foreign re-  
lations section. Segre was probably asked to draft the report  
in order to determine the Party's position on East-West issues.

25X1 [redacted] //The report is more sympathetic to the Soviet po-  
sition on East-West issues than were the reports on the Helsinki  
agreement produced by representatives of the allied governments  
in the EC and NATO. It is in keeping, however, with the West  
European interest in a "balanced" approach that gives all sec-  
tions of the Helsinki agreement equal emphasis, and recommends  
an open mind about new proposals compatible with the East-West  
climate at the time the conference opens in Belgrade.//

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[redacted] The Western European Union is a forum for discussing west European defense matters; it is composed of members of parliament from Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK, and West Germany.

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
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